Abstract. Lossy trapdoor functions, introduced by Peikert and Waters (STOC'08), have received a lot of attention in the last years, because of their wide range of applications in theoretical cryptography. The notion has been recently extended to the identity-based scenario by Bellare et al. (Eurocrypt'12). We provide one more step in this direction, by considering the notion of hierarchical identity-based lossy trapdoor functions (HIB-LTDFs). Hierarchical identity-based cryptography generalizes identitybased cryptography in the sense that identities are organized in a hierarchical way; a parent identity has more power than its descendants, because it can generate valid secret keys for them. Hierarchical identity-based cryptography has been proved very useful both for practical applications and to establish theoretical relations with other cryptographic primitives. In order to realize HIB-LTDFs, we first build a weakly secure hierarchical predicate encryption scheme. This scheme, which may be of independent interest, is then used as a key ingredient to design a HIB-LTDF. By appropriately choosing parameters, the resulting function can be proved secure against either selective or adaptive adversaries although the underlying predicate encryption system is only selectively secure. Combining this new function with well-known results in the area, we notably obtain hierarchical identity-based encryption schemes and forward-secure cryptosystems that are deterministic or maintain some security when messages are encrypted using randomness of poor quality.
Introduction
(Identity-Based) Lossy Trapdoor Functions. Lossy trapdoor functions, as introduced by Peikert and Waters in [25] , have been proved very powerful in theoretical cryptography and received a lot of attention in the recent years (see, e.g., [16, 19, 23, 11, 20, 29] ). Roughly speaking, a lossy trapdoor function is a family of functions that can be instantiated in two different modes. In the injective mode, the function is injective and can be inverted using the corresponding trapdoor. In lossy mode, the function is (highly) non-injective since its image size is much smaller than the size of the domain. The key point is that lossy instantiations of the function must be indistinguishable from injective instantiations.
In their seminal paper [25] , Peikers and Waters showed that lossy trapdoor functions provide black-box constructions of chosen-plaintext secure (IND-CPA) and chosen-ciphertext secure (IND-CCA) public-key encryption schemes, universal one-way and collision-resistant hash functions. Later on, other applications of lossy trapdoor functions were discovered: they gave rise to deterministic encryption schemes [4] in the standard model [8] , public-key encryption hedged schemes maintaining some security in the absence of reliable encryption coins [5] and even public key encryption with selective-opening security [6] (i.e., which offer certain security guarantees in case of sender corruption).
Very recently, Bellare, Kiltz, Peikert and Waters [7] introduced the notion of identity-based lossy trapdoor function, which is the analogue of lossy trapdoor functions in the setting of identity-based cryptography [28] . In the identity-based scenario, users' public keys are directly derived from their identities, whereas secret keys are delivered by a trusted master entity. In this way, the need for digital certificates, which usually bind public keys to users in traditional public-key cryptography, is drastically reduced. Moreover, identity-based lossy trapdoor functions (IB-LTDFs) often lead to the same cryptographic results as lossy trapdoor functions, but in the identity-based setting. Namely, in the case of selective adversaries (who choose their target identity upfront in the attack game), they imply identity-based deterministic encryption and identity-based hedged encryption.
Bellare et al. [7] proposed instantiations of identity-based lossy trapdoor functions based on bilinear maps and on lattices (as noted in [7] , almost all IBE schemes belong to these families). The former makes clever use of an anonymous IBE system (where the ciphertext hides the receiver's identity) with pseudorandom ciphertexts whereas the latter relies on lossiness properties of learning-with-error-based cryptosystems.
Throughout the last decade, several generalizations of identity-based cryptography were put forth, including hierarchical identity-based cryptography [17] , attribute-based cryptography [26, 18] or predicate-based cryptography [9, 21] . In this work, we will focus on the setting of hierarchical identity-based cryptography. Therein, the identities are organized in a hierarchical way, so that a user who holds the secret key of an identity id can generate, use and distribute valid secret keys for any identity that is a descendant of id in the hierarchy. Hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) is of great interest due to both practical and theoretical reasons. On the practical side, many organizations and systems that may need (identity-based) cryptographic solutions are organized in a hierarchical way. On the theoretical side, generic constructions [12, 13] are known to transform a weakly secure HIBE scheme (i.e., IND-CPA security against selective adversaries) into (public-key) encryption schemes with strong security properties, like chosen-ciphertext security [13] or forward-security [3, 12] , where private keys are updated in such a way that past encryptions remain safe after a private key exposure.
Our Contribution. This paper extends to the hierarchical setting the notion of identity-based lossy trapdoor function. It is worth mentioning that, using lattice basis delegation algorithms [14] , the lattice-based function of Bellare et al. [7] may easily lend itself to a hierarchical extension. Here, we focus on pairing-based systems where, as already mentioned in [7] , greater challenges are faced. Indeed, currently available lattice-based HIBE systems [14, 1, 2] natively provide anonymity whereas, in the hierarchical scenario, anonymity has been harder to obtain in the world of pairings: indeed, the first anonymous HIBE construction [10] appeared four years after the first collusion-resistant HIBE [17] . Moreover, not all anonymous IBE systems seem amenable for constructing IB-LTDFs, as noted in [7] where a new scheme was specially designed for that.
Using bilinear maps, we thus construct a hierarchical identity-based lossy trapdoor function (HIB-LTDF) whose security relies on relatively weak hardness assumptions in groups of prime order. As an intermediate step, we design a hierarchical predicate encryption (HPE) system [27, 24] with suitable anonymity properties, which may be of independent interest. Perhaps surprisingly, although this scheme is proved secure only against weak selective adversaries (who select their target attribute set before seeing the public parameters), we are able to turn it into a HIB-LTDF providing security (namely, partial lossiness as defined in [7] ) against adaptive adversaries for a constant number of levels.
Beyond its hierarchical nature, our construction brings up an alternative design principle for (H)IB-LTDFs: while the pairing-based construction of Bellare et al. [7] builds on an adaptively secure anonymous IBE, our (hierarchical) IB-LTDF is obtained from a selectively weakly attribute-hiding (hierarchical) predicate encryption system. In comparison with [7] , we thus start from a more powerful primitive -because predicate encryption implies anonymous IBE -but only need a weaker security level to begin with. Both HIB-LTDF constructions rely on specific algebraic properties in the underlying IBE/HPE and neither is generic.
Combining our HIB-LTDF with existing results in public-key cryptography, we obtain the following results: (1) the first selectively secure hierarchical identity-based deterministic encryption scheme, (2) the first selectively secure hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme that hedges against bad randomness as advocated by Bellare et al. [5] , (3) the first forward-secure deterministic and "hedged" encryption schemes. Although our scheme is not practical due to large ciphertexts and key sizes, it provides the first feasibility results in these directions.
Organization. After recalling the necessary computational assumptions and the syntax of hierarchical predicate encryption, we introduce in Section 2 the new notion of hierarchical identity-based lossy trapdoor functions: we describe the protocols of such functions, and the required security property of partial lossiness (in both a selective and an adpative setting). Then, we propose and analyze a new hierarchical predicate encryption scheme in Section 3, which is later used as a key ingredient in Section 4, where we construct a specific hierarchical identity-based lossy trapdoor function and we prove its security.
Background and Definitions

Complexity Assumptions
We consider groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p for which an asymmetric bilinear map e : G ×Ĝ → G T is efficiently computable. We will assume that the DDH assumption holds in both G andĜ, which implies that no isomorphism is efficiently computable in either direction between G andĜ. In this setting, the assumptions that we need are sometimes somewhat stronger than DDH. However, these assumptions have constant size and they are not new: for example, the second one was used in [15] .
The Bilinear Diffie Hellman Assumption (BDH): in bilinear groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p, it is computationally infeasible to distinguish the the distributions
The P-BDH 1 Assumption: in asymmetric bilinear groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p, the distributions
are indistinguishable for any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm. The DDH 2 Assumption: in asymmetric bilinear groups (G,Ĝ, G T ) of prime order p, the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable 
Definitions for Hierarchical Predicate Encryption
A tuple of integers
\{ 0} for i = 1 to d, for some p ∈ N, and also define the universe of hierarchical attributes as
..,d} , we will consider the (inner-product) hierarchical predicate f ( X 1 ,..., X ℓ ) ( Y 1 , . . . , Y κ ) = 1 iff ℓ ≤ κ and X i · Y i = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. The space of hierarchical predicates is defined to be
and the integer κ (resp. ℓ) is called the depth (resp. the level) of ( Y 1 , . . . , Y κ ) (resp. ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ )).
Let ν = (µ 1 , d; ν 1 , . . . , ν d ) be a format hierarchy. A hierarchical predicate encryption (HPE) scheme for a predicate family F consists of these algorithms.
-Create-delegated-key: A chooses a private key that was previously created for some predicate f and also specifies another predicate f ′ ≤ f that f is a prefix of. The challenger then computes a delegated key SK f ′ for f ′ without revealing it to A. -Reveal-key: A asks the challenger to give out a previously created key.
For each Reveal-key query ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ), it is required that 
A's advantage is quantified as the distance
Adv(A) = | Pr[β ′ = β] − 1/2|.
Definitions for Hierarchical Identity-Based Lossy Trapdoor Functions
In this section we extend to the hierarchical scenario the definitions for identity-based (lossy) trapdoor functions given in [7] .
Syntax. A hierarchical identity-based trapdoor function (HIB-TDF) is a tuple of efficient algorithms HF = (HF.Setup, HF.MKg, HF.Kg, HF.Del, HF.Eval, HF.Inv). The setup algorithm HF.Setup takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a set of global public parameters pms, which specifies an input space InpSp, an identity space IdSp and the necessary mathematical objects and hash functions. The master key generation algorithm HF.MKg takes as input pms and outputs a master public key mpk and a master secret key msk. The key generation algorithm HF.Kg takes as input pms, msk and a hierarchical identity (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) ∈ IdSp, for some ℓ ≥ 1 and outputs a secret key SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ) . The delegation algorithm HF.Del takes as input pms, msk, a hierarchical identity (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), a secret key SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ) for it, and an additional identity id ℓ+1 ; the output is a secret key SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ,id ℓ+1 ) for the hierarchical identity (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ , id ℓ+1 ) iff (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ , id ℓ+1 ) ∈ IdSp. The evaluation algorithm HF.Eval takes as input pms, msk, a hierarchical identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) and a value X ∈ InpSp; the result of the evaluation is denoted as C. Finally, the inversion algorithm HF.Inv takes as input pms, msk, a hierarchical identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), a secret key SK id for it and an evaluation C, and outputs a valueX ∈ InpSp.
A HIB-TDF satisfies the property of correctness if
for any X ∈ InpSp, any pms, (mpk, msk) generated by HF.Setup and HF.MKg, any hierarchical identity (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) ∈ IdSp and any secret key SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ) generated either by running HF.Kg pms, msk, (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) or by applying the delegation algorithm HF.Del to secret keys of shorter hierarchical identities. A particular way of constructing HIB-TDFs is to consider extended HIB-TDFs; the only difference between HIB-TDFs and extended HIB-TDFs is that, in the latter, the algorithm HF.Setup specifies in pms an auxiliary input space AuxSp, and HF.MKg takes as additional auxiliary input aux ∈ AuxSp.
Security. The basic security property of a trapdoor function is one-wayness, which means that an adversary cannot invert the function without the suitable secret key. Partial lossiness was introduced in [7] , where it was also proven to imply one-wayness. This result is easily extended to the hierarchical scenario, and for this reason, we focus on the property of partial lossiness. Before giving its formal definition, let us recall the notion of lossiness: if f is a function with domain Dom(f ) and image Im(f ) = {f (x) : x ∈ Dom(f )}, we say that f is ω-lossy if λ(f ) ≥ ω, where λ(f ) = log Observe that, given that d 
A Selectively Secure Weakly Attribute-Hiding Hierarchical Predicate Encryption Scheme
We propose here a new hierarchical predicate encryption (HPE) scheme which considers innerproduct predicates, and which will be used as a key ingredient in the design of our HIB-LTDF, in Section 4. For simplicity, we assume that vectors of attributes are all of the same length µ ∈ N at each level. The construction is inspired from the Shi-Waters delegatable predicate encryption scheme [27] . However, we have to turn it into a predicate encryption scheme for inner product relations (like the one of Okamoto and Takashima [24] ) instead of a hidden vector encryption [9] . Another difficulty to solve is that we cannot use composite order groups as in [27] because, in our HIB-LTDF of Section 4, one of the subgroups would leak information on the input in lossy mode (this is actually what happened with our initial attempt). For this reason, we chose to work with prime-order groups and used asymmetric pairing configurations to anonymize ciphertexts. As a benefit, we obtain a better efficiency than by using the techniques of [9] by reducing the number of pairing evaluations.
Setup(λ, µ): given λ ∈ N and the desired length µ of the attribute vectors at each level, choose asymmetric bilinear groups (G,Ĝ,
The master public key is defined to be
while the master secret key is msk := ĝ,ĝ α ,v,ŵ, {ĥ i 1 ,i 2 } i 1 ∈{1,...,d}, i 2 ∈{0,...,µ} .
Keygen msk, ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ) : to generate a private key for vectors (
To define the elements of its delegation component SK DL
, . . . , ℓ}, i 2 ∈ {1, . . . , µ} and set:
Output the private key
, do the following.
1. Randomize SK DL by raising all its component to some z R ← Z * p . Call this new key SK DL and write its elements with a hat (e.g., K j,k = K z j,k ).
Compute a partial decryption key
where we define the exponents s ℓ+1,
. . , ℓ}, and
3. For all j ∈ {ℓ + 2, . . . , d}, k ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, compute re-randomized versions of the partial decryption key by raising the partial decryption key to a random power τ j,k
These values will be used to compute the delegation component of the new key at step 5.
Compute a decryption component SK
′ D = (D ′ , D ′ w , {D ′ i 1 } ℓ+1 i 1 =1 ) for the delegated key by setting D ′ = D · K ℓ+1 , D ′ w = D w · L w,ℓ+1 . Then, define D ′ ℓ+1 = L ℓ+1,ℓ+1 and, for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, set D ′ i 1 = D i 1 · L ℓ+1,i 1 .
Compute a delegation component for the delegated key. For each
Then, for k = 1 to µ and i 1 = 1 to ℓ + 1, set
Return the delegated private key
The ciphertext is
where
..,µ} . Then, do the following.
For each index
Our HIB-LTDF uses the predicate-only variant of the above scheme. This variant is obtained by discarding the ciphertext component C 0 (which contains the payload) and the factorĝ α from the private key component D.
Although the scheme is only proved secure in the sense of a relatively weak definition (see next section), we believe it is of interest in its own right as it seems to be the fastest known hierarchical predicate encryption system. Indeed, the number of pairing evaluations only depends on the depth ℓ of the predicate ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ) encoded in the private key and not on the dimension n of vectors at each level. This appears to be a unique feature among all known such systems: previous constructions cost O(ℓ · n) pairing evaluations to decrypt. It would be interesting to see if a similarly efficient scheme can be proved fully secure.
Analysis of the New HPE Scheme
Let us prove now that our hierarchical predicate encryption scheme is both correct and selectively weakly attribute-hiding.
Correctness Lemma 1. The scheme given in Section 3 is correct. This is, for any plaintext M and any vectors
This fact does not depend on whether the key SK ( X 1 ,..., X ℓ ) was created using the Delegate or the Keygen algorithm.
Proof. Let SK ( X 1 ,..., X ℓ ) = SK D , SK DL be the output of running the key generation protocol Keygen msk, ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ) , where each attribute vector is
ℓ}. Let us write the decryption component of the key as SK
, and by the definition of hierarchical inner-product predicates, we know that ℓ ≤ κ and X i · Y i = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Therefore, when the decryption protocol Decrypt mpk, ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ), SK ( X 1 ,..., X ℓ ) , C computes C i 1 , for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, the obtained value equals
s . The decryption protocol computes then the pairing of this
Multiplying all these pairings, for indices i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, one obtains e v s ,
This value is cancelled out with one of the factors of e(C v , D),
. The other two factors of e(C v , D) are e(v s ,ĝ α ) and e(v s ,ŵ rw ), which cancel out the factor e(g,v) αs , contained in C 0 = M · e(g,v) αs , and the factor e(C w , D w ) = e(w s ,v rw ), respectively. Therefore, the final computation of the decryption protocol results in the plaintext M contained in C 0 .
In this way, we have proved that the encryption and decryption protocols work correctly when the original secret keys (resulting from Keygen) are used. The fact that the decryption protocol works fine also with delegated secret keys (resulting from Delegate) is a consequence of Lemma 2, inside the proof of Theorem 1 below. If a delegated secret key could lead to an incorrect decryption, then this fact could be used to distinguish original secret keys from delegated ones, which would contradict the statement of Lemma 2.
⊓ ⊔
Attribute-Hiding Property
The new hierarchical predicate encryption scheme is selectively weakly attribute-hiding under the BDH, P-BDH 1 and DDH 2 assumptions, as proved below. We want to stress that the security of its predicate-only variant (which is the one used as a key ingredient in the design of our HIB-LTDF) relies only on the latter two assumptions.
Theorem 1. The scheme given in Section 3 is selectively weakly attribute-hiding if the BDH, P-
The proof considers a sequence of games starting with the real game and ending with a game where the adversary has no advantage and wins with probability exactly 1/2.
For each i, we denote by S i the event that the adversary wins in Game i . In the whole sequence of games, we call d ⋆ the depth of the challenge hierarchical vectors ( Y 0
which is chosen independently of M 0 and M 1 . Game 3 : is identical to Game 2 with the difference that, in the challenge ciphertext, C ⋆ w is replaced by a random group element chosen uniformly and independently in G.
: is identical to Game 3 with the difference that, in the challenge ciphertext,
are replaced by random elements of
Other group elements (i.e., for which i > i 1 or (i = i 1 ) ∧ (i 2 > j)) are still computed as in a normal challenge ciphertext.
In Game 4,d ⋆ ,µ , it is easy to see that the adversary A cannot guess β ∈ {0, 1} with higher probability than Pr[S 4,d ⋆ ,µ ] = 1/2 since the challenge ciphertext C ⋆ is completely independent of β ∈ {0, 1}. ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 2. Game 0 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable if the DDH 2 assumption holds in (G,Ĝ).
Proof. The lemma will be proved by a hybrid argument. We define Game 0,i for all 0 ≤ i ≤ q. Game 0,i differs from Game 0 in the fact that, when the adversary issues the first i delegation queries, instead of generating the delegated keys faithfully using the Delegate algorithm, the challenger calls the Keygen algorithm to generate these delegated keys. For all the remaining queries, the challenger computes keys and responds faithfully as in Game 0 . Under the above definition, Game 0,0 is the same as Game 0 and Game 0,q is the same as Game 1 . We will prove that Game 0,κ is indistinguishable from Game 0,κ+1 for all 0 ≤ κ ≤ q − 1. To this end, we will proceed similarly to [27] and rely on a generalized version (called GDDH hereafter) of the DDH problem inĜ. Given a group generator GG, define the following distribution P (λ):
For an algorithm A, define A's advantage in solving the above problem:
where (X, Q) ← P (λ) and R ←Ĝ ℓ . It is immediate 5 that GDDH is not easier than DDH 2 and that the latter advantage function is negligible if the DDH 2 assumption holds in (G,Ĝ).
To prove that Game 0,κ is indistinguishable from Game 0,κ+1 we will use another hybrid argument. We define Game ′ 0,κ , which differs from Game 0,κ in that, for the (κ + 1)-th delegation query, SK DL 5 The straightforward reduction computes a GDDH instance from a DDH2 instance g,ĝ,ĝ
is the delegation component of a fresh key, instead of a delegation component obtained by raising every element in SK DL to the same random power z ∈ R Z p . We show that a PPT adversary cannot distinguish between the two games. We also define Game ′′ 0,κ , which differs from Game ′ 0,κ in that, for the (κ + 1)-th delegation query, instead of re-randomizing the components of the partial decryption key with the same exponent
w,ℓ+1 are randomized with different independently chosen exponents, while K ′ j,k is chosen in such a way that the resulting key is still valid. We also prove that no PPT adversary can notice the difference.
We will argue that Game ′′ 0,κ =Game 0,κ+1 . Indeed, in the first step, we change SK DL so that, in step 2 of the Delegate algorithm, we obtain a randomized decryption key (except for the g α term). When multiplied by SK D , it gives a randomized decryption key for ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ+1 ). On the other hand, in step 2 of the hybrid proof we change the partial decryption keys so that they also are randomized keys except the g α term.
Claim. Game 0,κ is computationally indistinguishable from Game ′ 0,κ . Proof. Let q 0 denote the maximum number of secret key queries (taking into account both the "Create-key" and "Create-delegated-key" queries) made by the adversary. We build a simulator B that uses A to break the following (
..,µ},k∈{1,...,d+1} ) Then, the challenger randomly decides to give (X, Q ′ = Q) or (X, Q ′ = R), where R is a random vector of elements inĜ of the size of Q. The simulator will use A as a subroutine to break the above problem.
Init and Setup. At the beginning of the security game, the adversary commits to two hierarchical vectors (
The simulator chooses the public and the secret key as usual according to the Setup algorithm. Let c = log v (w) and a i 1 ,i 2 = log v (h i 1 ,i 2 ). Note that these values are known to the simulator since they are easily computable from msk.
Secret key queries. We distinguish three cases:
• When a "create-key" query or one of the first κ delegated secret key queries is made, the simulator computes and saves a private key, which is given to A when a "reveal-key" query is made. To compute this secret key, the simulator uses the elements from the GDDH instance, in such a way that the exponents are distributed at random. In particular, if it is the i-th query, the simulator defines the components of the decryption component of the key as:
For the delegation component of the key, for all j ∈ {ℓ+1 . . . d}, all k ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, the simulator lets:
As the simulator knows the discrete logarithms c = logv(ŵ) and a i 1 ,i 2 = logv(ĥ i 1 ,i 2 ), for each j ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . d} and all k ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, it can compute the remaining components of the key as follows:
(1)
• When the adversary makes the (κ + 1)-th delegation query, it specifies a parent key and asks to fix the level of the hierarchy to some vector X ℓ+1 . In particular, assume that the parent key was created in the i-th query. When performing Step 1 of the Delegate algorithm, for all j ∈ {ℓ + 2, . . . d}, k ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, the simulator sets
and computes K j,k , for each j ∈ {ℓ + 2, . . . d}, k ∈ {1, . . . , µ} exactly in the same way as in expression (1) .
• For all the remaining queries, the simulator responds faithfully as in the real game.
Clearly, if Q ′ = Q in the GDDH instance, then the above simulation is identical to Game 0,κ . Otherwise, it is identical to Game ′ 0,κ since, in the the (κ + 1)-th delegation query, Q = R implicitly defines a set of fresh random values for s j , s j,k,i 1 , s w,j,k , for the appropriate values of j, k, i 1 .
Challenge The simulator generates the challenge ciphertext as normal.
Guess If the adversary has a difference of ǫ in its advantage in Game 0,κ and Game ′ 0,κ , the simulator has a comparable advantage in solving the GDDH instance.
Claim. Game ′ 0,κ is computationally indistinguishable from Game ′′ 0,κ .
Proof. To prove this claim, we will appeal to a nested hybrid argument. Let Game ′ 0,κ,0,0 =Game ′ 0,κ , and for 1 ≤ η ≤ (d−ℓ−1), 1 ≤ ν ≤ µ, define Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν as the game that differs from Game ′ 0,κ in the following: in the step of the delegation algorithm where the components {L
are created by re-randomizing the partial decryption key with some exponent τ j,k , we re-randomize instead each of these components with a different exponent chosen uniformly and independently at random whenever (j, k) ≤ (η + ℓ + 1, ν) (in lexicographic order). Observe that, by definition, Game ′ 0,κ,d−ℓ−1,µ =Game ′′ 0,κ . We will show that an adversary cannot distinguish between one game and the next. That is, if we define and Game ′ 0,κ,η,µ+1 =Game ′ 0,κ,η+1,0 to simplify the notation, what we we will show is that no polynomial time adversary can distinguish between Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν and Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν+1 .
The simulator tries to solve the following (µ(d + 1))-GDDH instance.
The simulator tries to distinguish between (X, Q ′ = Q) and (X, Q ′ = R) where R is a random vector fromĜ. The simulator uses as a subroutine an adversary A who can distinguish between Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν and Game
The simulator runs the Setup algorithm as usual in such a way that it knows the discrete logarithms c = log v (w) = logv(ŵ) and
To answer secret key queries, the simulator proceeds as follows:
• For the first κ-th delegation queries and all of the "create-key" queries, the simulator computes the keys freshly at random.
• At the (κ + 1)-th delegation query, the adversary specifies a parent key and requests to fix the (ℓ + 1)-th level of the hierarchy to X ℓ+1 . To answer this query, the simulator first generates some components of SK DL simply by choosing at random the values L j , L w,j,k for all j ∈ {ℓ + 2, . . . , d}, k ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. To compute the remaining components and the decryption key component, the simulator sets
Since the simulator knows the discrete logarithms c = logv(ŵ) and a i 1 ,i 2 = logv(ĥ i 1 ,i 2 ), the remaining components of SK DL and those of the partial decryption key can be generated efficiently in the same way as in the proof of indistinguishability of Game 0,κ and Game ′ 0,κ . In particular, the simulator can compute lexicographic order) , the values are chosen as fresh random delegation keys. For the (η +ℓ+1, ν +1) partial decryption key, the simulator lets
Again, as the simulator knows the discrete logarithm ofŵ,ĥ i 1 ,i 2 w.r.t. the basev, the remaining terms -including K (η+ℓ+1,ν+1) ℓ+1
-can be generated efficiently. For the remaining partial decryption keys, the simulator generates them faithfully using the Delegate algorithm.
• The remaining delegated key queries are generated faithfully.
Clearly, if Q ′ = Q in the GDDH instance, then the above simulation is identically distributed as Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν , otherwise it is identically distributed as Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν+1 .
The simulator generates the challenge ciphertext as normal and sends it to the adversary. If the adversary has ǫ difference in its advantage in Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν and Game ′ 0,κ,η,ν+1 , it is not hard to see that the simulator has a comparable advantage in solving the GDDH instance. Proof. Assume that there's an adversary A that can distinguish between Game 1 and Game 2 . We build an adversary B that uses A as a subroutine to break the BDH assumption. The simulator B receives as input
where Q ′ is either e(g,ĝ) abc or an element chosen uniformly at random in G T . The adversary A commits to two vectors
The simulator B runs the Setup algorithm as usual except that it implicitly sets α to be ab by defining e(g,v) α = e(g a ,ĝ b ) αv , and then, for i 1 = 1, . . . , d and
. . , µ} and h i 1 ,0 = (g a ) −z i 1 , for some random exponents
The values ofĥ i 1 ,i 2 for i 1 ∈ {1 . . . , d}, i 2 ∈ {0, . . . , µ} are defined similarly from the valuê g a of the BDH instance. Observe that β remains hidden from A and that the parameters are correctly distributed. For the secret key queries, in the last lemma we have just proven that delegated keys are indistinguishable from freshly generated ones. Therefore, B will generate the secret keys using algorithm Keygen when a reveal query is made. Note that α is defined as ab, which is not known to B. However, B needs to simulate secret keys for ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ) as long as
As α doesn't appear in the delegating component of the key, the delegation component of the secret keys SK DL can be created using the parameters as usual. Therefore, from now on we focus on how to create the decryption component of the secret key. Denote by ℓ ′ the index of the smallest element of the vector ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ) for which X ℓ ′ · Y The simulator creates the decryption component of the secret key as follows:
where the termĝ ab
while the other terms in the product are just computed as usual. It is not hard to see that, if we define
, then the computation is correct. All the other terms in the decryption component can be computed efficiently, since the simulator knows all the parameters needed and it also knowsĝ b .
At the challenge step, the adversary A gives B two messages, M 0 and M 1 . B then computes
It is not hard to check that the challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed. Finally, when the adversary A outputs a guess β ′ , if β = β ′ , then B guesses that Q ′ = e(g,ĝ) abc and if β = β ′ guesses that Q ′ = R. If A has ǫ advantage in distinguishing between the two cases, then B also has ǫ advantage in solving the assumption G3DH instance, except in the case that A managed to output some secret key query for vector ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ) for which X i · Y β i = 0 for all i = d ⋆ + 1, . . . , d was zero for all i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, which occurs only with negligible probability.
Lemma 4. Game 2 and Game 3 are computationally indistinguishable if the P-BDH 1 assumption holds in (G,Ĝ).
Proof. Assuming that the adversary A outputs β ′ = β with noticeably different probabilities in Game 2 and Game 3 , we build an distinguisher B for the P-BDH 1 assumption .
Namely, algorithm B receives as input a tuple It defines the master public key by setting e(g,v) α = e(g,ĝ) α·γv and
where α, γ v , x, y R ← Z p and γ i 1 ,i 2 R ← Z p , for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d}, i 2 ∈ {0, . . . , µ}. For each i 1 , we also define the vector γ i 1 = (γ i 1 ,1 , . . . , γ i 1 ,µ ) ∈ Z µ p . We observe that B does not knowŵ (which depends on the unavailable termĝ ab ) but can compute {ĥ i 1 ,i 2 } i 1 ∈{1,...,d},i 2 ∈{1,...,µ} .
When the adversary A requests a key for a hierarchical vector X = ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ), B parses X i 1 as (x i 1 ,1 , . . . , x i 1 ,µ ) ∈ Z µ p for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. Then, B responds as follows.
• If ℓ ≤ d ⋆ , let i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} be the smallest index such that X i · Y 
and can compute
without knowingĝ ab . Similarly, it can compute
as well as D w =v rw . We now turn to indices i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}\{i}, for which B can trivially compute ( When B has to construct the challenge ciphertext, B sets C 0 = M · e(g c ,ĝ γv ) α , where M R ← G T , and
We observe that, if z = abc,
..,µ} ) corresponds to a valid ciphertext with the encryption exponent s = c. In this situation, B is playing Game 2 with A.
In contrast, if z ∈ R Z p , we have z = c with overwhelming probability. In this case, we have g z = g abc+θ , for some θ = 0, and we can thus write C w = w c · g θ·x . This means that C w looks uniformly random and independent from A's view. Indeed, until the challenge phase, A has no information about θ ∈ Z p (recall that public parameters do not depend on c) and the value x ∈ Z p 1 is also independent of A's view. We conclude that, if g z is such that z ∈ R Z p , we are in Game 3 . ⊓ ⊔ Lemma 5. For each δ 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} and each δ 2 ∈ {2, . . . , µ}, Game 4,δ 1 ,δ 2 −1 and Game 4,δ 1 ,δ 2 are computationally indistinguishable if the P-BDH 1 assumption holds in (G,Ĝ).
Proof. Towards a contradiction, we assume there exists δ 1 , δ 2 such that the adversary A outputs β ′ = β with significantly different probabilities in Game 4,δ 1 ,δ 2 −1 and Game 4,δ 1 ,δ 2 . We show that A implies a distinguisher B against P-BDH 1 .
To do this, B runs the adversary A as follows. It first receives the challenge vectors ( 
, . . . , d}, i 2 ∈ {0, . . . , µ}. For each i 1 , we also define the vector γ i 1 = (γ i 1 ,1 , . . . , γ i 1 ,µ ) ∈ Z µ p . Note that, in the implicitly defined master secret key msk, the distinguisher B knows all the components butĥ δ 1 ,δ 2 , which depends on the unknown termĝ ab .
•
and can compute the product
which is the only factor of D that it cannot trivially compute without knowingĝ ab . Similarly, it can compute D w = v rw =ĝ γv ·r ′ w · (ĝ a ) −γv·r δ 1 ·γ δ 1 ,δ 2 /x . To generate the delegation component SK DL of the key, the reduction B is able to compute {K j,k , L w,j,k } j∈{ℓ+1,...,d},k∈{1,...,µ} by repeating (d − ℓ) · µ times the same procedure as for computing D and D w .
..,µ} ,v andŵ. The difficulty is to compute the delegation components {K δ 1 ,k } µ k=1 without knowingĝ ab . In fact, among these components, the only factor of K δ 1 ,δ 2 that B cannot trivially compute isĥ
However, similarly to (5)- (6), it can choose
and compute the product
In the same way, B computes
Note that, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , µ}\{δ 2 }, B has to generate K δ 1 ,k by computingĥ
δ 1 ,k using the same random exponent s δ 1 as in (7). This is always possible since B knows that exponent.
When it comes to construct the challenge ciphertext, algorithm B first sets
as well as
We observe that, in the situation where z = abc,
..,µ} ) is distributed in the same way as in Game 4,δ 1 ,δ 2 −1 .
In contrast, if z ∈ R Z p , we have z = c with overwhelming probability. In this case, C δ 1 ,δ 2 looks random to the adversary and B is thus playing Game 4,δ 1 ,δ 2 .
A Hierarchical Identity-Based Lossy Trapdoor Function
Intuition
From the HPE scheme of Section 3, our hierarchical lossy function is obtained by including a n × n matrix of HPE ciphertexts in the master public parameters. As in the DDH-based lossy function of Peikert and Waters [25] , each row of the matrix is associated with an encryption exponent, which is re-used throughout the entire row. Each column corresponds to a different set of public parameters in the HPE system. Depending on whether the public parameters of the HIB-LTDF are prepared for the injective mode or the partially lossy mode, all HPE ciphertexts in the matrix correspond to different hierarchical vectors (y 1 , . . . , y d ) ∈ Z d·µ p . The selective weak attribute-hiding property of the HPE scheme guarantees that the two setups are computationally indistinguishable.
In order to evaluate a function for some hierarchical identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), the evaluation algorithm first computes a transformation on HPE ciphertexts. During this transformation, inner products of the form y i 1 , id i 1 are calculated in the exponent for i 1 = 1 to ℓ. The transformation gives a n × n matrix (10) of anonymous HIBE ciphertexts that are always well-formed in nondiagonal entries. As for diagonal entries, they contain "perturbed" HIBE ciphertexts: at each level, one ciphertext component contains a perturbation factor of the form y i 1 , id i 1 . In this matrix of HIBE ciphertexts, random encryption exponents are again re-used in all positions at each row.
The function evaluation is then carried out as in [25] , by computing a matrix-vector product in the exponent and taking advantage of homomorphic properties of the HIBE scheme over the randomness space. The function output can be seen as a set of n anonymous HIBE ciphertexts -one for each input bit -which are well-formed ciphertexts if and only if the corresponding input bit is 0 (i.e., if and only if the perturbation factors { y i 1 , id i 1 } ℓ i 1 =1 are left out when computing the matrixvector product in the exponent). The function is thus inverted by testing the well-formedness of each HIBE ciphertext using the private key.
In the injective mode, the public parameters are generated in such a way that, for all identities id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), we have y i 1 , id i 1 = 0 for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}. In the partially lossy mode, we have y i 1 , id i 1 = 0 for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} with non-negligible probability. In this case, the inversion algorithm always outputs 0 n , regardless of the input.
Description
HF.Setup(λ, d, n, µ): given a security parameter λ ∈ N, the (constant) desired number of levels in the hierarchy d ∈ N and integers µ, n ∈ poly(λ) specifying the length of identities and that of function inputs, respectively, choose asymmetric bilinear groups (G,Ĝ,
ID . The public parameters are pms = p, (G,Ĝ, G T ), d, n, µ, InpSp, IdSp .
As in [7] , the master key generation algorithm of our HIB-TDF receives an auxiliary input y. Here, it is a concatenation of row vectors y 1 , . . . ,
HF.MKg(pms, y): parse the auxiliary input as y = [y 1 | . . . |y d ] ∈ Z d·µ p , and proceed as follows.
for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d}, i 2 ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, l 1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
b. Define a n × n matrix {CT[l 2 , l 1 ]} l 2 ,l 1 ∈{1,...,n} of HPE ciphertexts
The master public key consists of mpk := PP core , {CT[l 2 , l 1 ]} l 2 ,l 1 ∈{1,...,n} while the master secret key consists of msk := v,ŵ,ĥ .
HF.Kg pms, msk, (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) : to generate a key for an identity (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) ∈ IdSp, parse msk as v,ŵ,ĥ and id i 1 as id
and the delegation component
with j ∈ {ℓ + 1, . . . , d}, k ∈ {1, . . . , µ} and i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} as
HF.Del pms, mpk, (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ) , id ℓ+1 : parse SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ) as a HF private key of the form (SK D , SK DL ), and id ℓ+1 as a string
Define ℓ-th level HPE keys
where pms, mpk, (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), X : Given a n-bit input X = x 1 . . . x n ∈ {0, 1} n , for i 1 = 1 to ℓ,
. For l 1 = 1 to n, do the following.
1. For each l 2 ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute modified HPE ciphertexts by defining
for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, l 1 , l 2 ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The modified ciphertexts are
The resulting {CT id [l 2 , l 1 ]} l 2 ,l 1 ∈{1,...,n} thus form a n × n matrix of anonymous HIBE ciphertexts for the identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ).
Compute
Then return the output
HF.Inv pms, mpk, (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ) , C : parse the decryption component SK D of the private key as a tuple of the form (D, D w , Dw, {D i 1 } ℓ i 1 =1 ) and the output C as per (12) . Then, for
Otherwise, set x l 1 = 1. Eventually, return X = x 1 . . . x n ∈ {0, 1} n .
From (11), we notice that, with overwhelming probability, if there exists some i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} such that y i 1 , id i 1 = 0, relation (13) is satisfied if and only if x l 1 = 0. Indeed, in this case, the output (12) is distributed as a vector of n Boneh-Boyen HIBE ciphertexts (in their anonymous variant considered in [15] ). These ciphertexts correspond to the same encryption exponent s, X and are generated under n distinct master public keys sharing the same component v ∈ G. When the function is implemented in injective mode, the auxiliary input consists of a vector 
Security Analysis
We prove that the HIB-LTDF in the previous section satisfies the required security property (Definition 2), both against selective and adaptive adversaries.
To analyze the security of the scheme, in both the adaptive and the selective cases, we define two experiments, RL 0 and RL n . In both of them, HF.Setup is run and the public parameters are given to the adversary. Algorithm HF.MKg is run with auxiliary input y (0) = [ (1, 0, . . . , 0)| . . . |(1, 0, . . . , 0) ] in RL 0 , and with auxiliary input y (1) = [y (1) 1 | . . . |y (1) d ] in the experiment RL n , where y (1) is produced by an auxiliary input generator Aux(id) taking as input a special hierarchical identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ). The master public key mpk is given to the adversary. The adversary can request secret keys for identities id, as in definition 2, which will be answered using HF.Kg and HF.Del and will be added to IS, which is initialized to IS = {∅}. Also, the adversary will output a hierarchical identity id ⋆ , as in definition 2. Finally, the adversary will output a guess d ′ . Both in RL 0 and RL n , the experiment will halt and output 0 if a) for any id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) ∈ IS we have that y
If the experiment has not aborted, it will output the bit d ′ .
In both the selective and the adaptive cases, security will be a result of the following lemma, that we prove in a different section.
Lemma 6. Under the P-BDH 1 and DDH 2 assumptions, the experiments RL 0 and RL n return 1 with nearly identical probabilities. Namely, there exist PPT algorithms B 1 and B 2 such that
where q is the number of "Reveal-key" queries made by the adversary A.
Proof of Lemma 6
We consider a sequence of n + 1 hybrid experiments RL 0 , . . . , RL n . For each k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, RL k is defined to be an experiment where public parameters are generated as follows. First, the simulator
←Ĝ d×(µ+1)×n and computes PP core in the same way as in the real scheme.
In the second step of the setup procedure, the simulator B chooses a vector s
Then, for each pair (l 1 , l 2 ) such that l 1 = l 2 , B sets
Finally, for each l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} and i 2 ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, B defines
if l ≤ k,
if l > k. 
where q is the number of "Reveal-key" queries made by A.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that there exist two auxiliary hierarchical vector
1 | . . . |y (1) d ] and an index k ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that the adversary A has noticeably different behaviors in experiments RL k and RL k−1 . Using A, we construct a selective weakly attribute-hiding adversary B against the HPE scheme described in Section 3 (in its predicate-only variant).
Our adversary B first declares
as the vectors that it wishes to be challenged upon. Then, the HPE challenger provides B with public parameters
Then, B chooses a vector ζ R ← Z n p and a matrix γ ∈ Z d×(µ+1)×n p , which it uses to compute
for l 1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k}
for i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d}, i 2 ∈ {0, . . . , µ}, l 1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k}.
It also sets w[k] = w as well as
Then, B defines core public parameters
that correspond to the master secret key msk = (v,ŵ,ĥ), which is not completely known to B (specifically,v,ŵ[k] andĥ[., ., k] are not available). Then, B notifies its HPE challenger that it wishes to directly enter the challenge phase without making any pre-challenge query. The challenger replies with the challenge ciphertext
for a random element s R ← Z * p and a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}. Here we are using, for β ∈ {0, 1}, the notation y(β) = [y
At this point, B constructs the matrix {CT[i 1 , i 2 ]} l 1 ,l 2 ∈{1,...,n} of HPE ciphertexts by setting
for i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d}, i 2 ∈ {1, . . . , µ}.
and, for each l 1 ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k},
Note that this implicity sets s[k] = s, where s is the encryption exponent chosen by the HPE challenger to compute C ⋆ . Then, for each l 2 ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k}, B chooses a random exponent
for i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d}, i 2 ∈ {1, . . . , µ},
As for entries of the form {C[i 1 , i 2 , l, l]} i 1 ,i 2 ,l =k , B computes them as
if l > k. using the exponents s[l] ∈ Z * p that were chosen in (14) . Finally, our adversary B defines the n × n matrix {CT[l 2 , l 1 ]} l 2 ,l 1 ∈{1,...,n} of HPE ciphertexts
Finally, B defines mpk := PP core , {CT[l 2 , l 1 ]} l 2 ,l 1 ∈{1,...,n} and sends it to the adversary A.
When it comes to answer A's private key queries for hierarchical identities (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ), B first encodes each level's identity id i 1 ∈ {0, 1} µ as a µ-vector
of the private key are always directly computable when
←Ĝ, for i 1 = 1 to ℓ, and computes
It is easy to see that (
) forms a decryption component of the form (9) . Moreover, the delegation components can be obtained exactly in the same way.
As for the remaining coordinate l 1 = k, the simulator B aborts if, for anyγ ∈ {0, 1}, the obtained hierarchical vector ( X 1 , . . . , X ℓ ) is one for which y (γ) i 1 , X i 1 = 0 for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} (which translates into
in the predicate encryption language). Otherwise, B can obtain the missing private key components by invoking its HPE challenger to obtain a complete private key SK (id 1 ,...,id ℓ ) = (SK D , SK DL ).
It is easy to check that, if the HPE challenger's bit is β = 0, mpk is distributed as in Game RL k . In contrast, if β = 1, mpk has the same distribution as in Game RL k−1 .
Selective-id Security
We consider our HF with µ = 2, Σ ID = {(1, x) : x ∈ Z * p } and IdSp = (Σ ID ) (≤d) . We show that this HIB-LTDF is selective-id (n − log p, 1)-partially lossy. Let (id 
The running time of B 1 and B 2 are comparable to the running time of A.
Proof. Let RL 0 and RL n be the games specified above. We claim that Pr[REAL] = Pr[RL 0 ] and
e the experiment will never halt outputting 0 due to the queried id or id ⋆ except with negligible probability. This implies partial lossiness with δ = 1. It is straightforward to see that the first equality is true since RL 0 generates parameters with the auxiliary input y (0) , which results in HF.Eval being an injective function for all hierarchical identities id ∈ IdSp.
To see the other equality, recall that RL n generates the parameters with the auxiliary input y (1) given above. Note that any identity id = (id 1 , . . . , id ℓ ) satisfies that y
, id i 1 = 0 for all i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , d} if and only if id = id * . Further, the left-hand-side member of (13) has a factor of the form
Adaptive-id Security
For adaptive security we consider our construction of HF with a restricted identity space, namely taking Σ ID = {(1, x) : x ∈ {0, 1} µ−1 }. We show that this construction is adaptive-id δ-lossy with δ = 1/ 2 · (2qµ) d where q is the maximum number of "Reveal-key" queries of the adversary. We define a sibling LHF with AuxSp = Z 
Let n > log p and let ω = n − log p. Let HF be the HIB-LTDF with parameters n, µ, 
where the running time of B 1 and B 2 is that of
Proof. The difficulty of this proof is in relating the experiments RL 0 , RL n with the games REAL and LOSSY. This happens because the output d ′ of the adversary could be correlated with the fact that his queries cause the experiment to abort. For instance, we could have that the adversary perfectly distinguishes between REAL and LOSSY in game described in definition 2, but always queries for secret keys of lossy identities, while this would cause the experiments RL 0 , RL n to abort. To overcome this difficulty, we will use the technique of the artificial abort due to Waters with the improved analysis of [22] .
We call E(IS, id ⋆ ) the event that the experiment does not halt and outputs 0 (cases a) and b) detailed at the beginning of the subsection) over the choice of Y = {y ′ 1 , . 
The proof of this lemma is the main technical difficulty in translating the proof of Bellare et al. [7] to our setting. They use similar bounds, due to [22] , but we had to extend them to the hierarchical case.
Then, as in [7] , we define the games RL 0 and RL n that differ from RL 0 and RL n respectively in that, before returning the final output, an artificial abort stage is added before outputting the bit d ′ of the adversary. Intuitively, this step destroys the (possible) existing correlation between the event that a set of secret key queries leads to an abort and the output d ′ . In this artificial abort stage, an approximation η ′ (IS, id ⋆ ) of η(IS, id ⋆ ) is computed. Then, if η ′ (IS, id ⋆ ) > λ low the experiment halts and returns 0 as output with probability 1 − λ low /η ′ (IS, id ⋆ ). If the experiment doesn't abort, it returns the guess d ′ of the adversary.
We can now use [22, Lemma 6.3] , which states that if we use O(µ 3 · ρ −2 · ln((µqρ) −1 )) samples to compute the approximation η ′ (IS, id ⋆ ), then We use the value of δ instead of λ low since the latter depends on ℓ ⋆ , the hierarchy length of the challenge identity (and thus depends on the challenge identity), while the former only depends on d, the maximum number of hierarchical levels of the scheme.
Also, as in the selective case, we have Pr[LOSSY] = Pr[RL n ]. As RL n has the artificial abort, it will output 0 with more probability than RL n . This implies that Pr [ Proof. Fix the view of the adversary A, which implies fixing the queried identities id (1) , . . . , id (q) , id ⋆ . Although we are assuming that the adversary A makes the maximum number of queries, with a smaller number of queries we would have the same bounds. We abbreviate η = η(IS, id ⋆ ), y = y (1) and also call ℓ ⋆ the depth of the challenge identity id ⋆ . For an integer t, define the event To this end, we consider two cases: that ℓ (i) > ℓ ⋆ or ℓ (i) ≤ ℓ ⋆ . In the first case, for each i 1 ∈ {ℓ ⋆ + 1, . . . , ℓ (i) } such that For all indices i 1 ∈ ℓ ⋆ , the same probability is either 1 or 1/(2q).
If ℓ (i) ≤ ℓ ⋆ , for each i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ (i) }, we have We can conclude that η 2q ≥ 1/(2 ℓ ⋆ +1 q ℓ ⋆ ). For the upper bound on η 2q , we have η 2q ≤ 1/(2q) ℓ ⋆ , where we use that (1 − Pr[...]) ≤ 1 in (16) . Combining these bounds with the bounds on η, we get the statement of the Lemma. ⊓ ⊔
